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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA. By Franklin 
E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 1986. Pp. xviii, 192. $22.95. 
In the preface to Capital Punishment and the American Agenda, 
the authors1 announce that they write from the perspective of advo-
cates for abolition of capital punishment in the United States. Unlike 
more typical literature on this topic,2 however, their primary focus is 
not on the relative merits, or lack thereof, of the death penalty.3 In-
stead, they argue that abolition is the inevitable by-product of civiliza-
tion's evolving respect for human rights, and that the present state of 
American law is an aberration in this long-term trend. They contend 
that the United States has developed to the point where execution 
should be barred by the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment.4 But they also provide a theory to explain why 
capital punishment exists in the United States today, and they make 
predictions regarding the long-term viability of the institution. The 
result is a lucid book that provides interesting and worthwhile reading 
for the layman as well as the legal scholar. 
The book is divided into two main sections. In part 1, the authors 
chart the evolution of the abolition of capital punishment in Western 
democratic societies, exploring factors that account for the status of 
the United States as the only Western industrialized nation still exe-
cuting criminals (p. 3). In part 2, Zimring and Hawkins survey social 
and political factors that they expect will determine capital punish-
ment's future in America. 
Among nonexecuting nations of the world, abolition may be de 
jure or de facto. De facto abolitionist countries may reserve the death 
penalty for specific wartime offenses, or they may make it legally avail-
able even in time of peace. In either case, national policies and prac-
1. Franklin E. Zimring is a Professor of Law and the Director of the Earl Warren Legal 
Institute at the University of California, Berkeley. Gordon Hawkins is a Senior Fellow of the 
Earl Warren Legal Institute, and was formerly the Director of the Sydney University Institute of 
Criminology. 
2. See generally H. BEDAU, DEATH JS DIFFERENT (1987) (a collection of essays arguing 
against the morality and utility of capital punishment, as well as an examination of relevant 
political factors); c. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND 
MISTAKE (1974); Gibbs & Erickson, Capital Punishment and the Deterrence Doctrine, in CAPI-
TAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 299 (1976); White, The Role of Social Sciences in 
Determining the Constitutionality of Capital Punishment, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 3 (1976). 
3. For example, discussion of the often central topic of deterrence is relegated to the 
appendix. 
4. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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tices in these countries5 have precluded executions for at least a decade 
(p. 5). 
In contrast to abolitionist states, those nations (other than the 
United States) actively executing criminals are described as "politi-
cally repressive" (p. 6). Citing South Africa, Latin America, the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and many Middle Eastern 
countries as examples, the authors contend that there is a demonstra-
ble negative correlation between proexecution policy and governmen-
tal respect for human rights (pp. 6-8). 
The Western democracies' movements toward abolition have been 
independent and uncoordinated, yet recurrent themes form a pattern. 
Typically, a period of decline in the rate of executions is followed by a 
long period of abeyance prior to official abolition. At some point be-
tween abeyance and official abolition, the threat of the death penalty 
ceases to have any meaning. 6 When the government does take the step 
of official abolition, its action invariably runs counter to popular opin-
ion (p. 12). But as the availability of the death penalty fades from the 
public's memory, the next most severe punishment (life imprisonment) 
takes on the symbolic importance previously accorded capital punish-
ment (p. 162). 
The United States has long been a leader in the advancement of 
human rights, and abolition of the death penalty took place in some 
U.S. states years before the first instance of abolition in Europe.7 By 
1972, when the Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia, 8 the 
United States as a whole was at or beyond the point in the evolution of 
civilized society at which abolition typically becomes appropriate (p. 
26). Executions had declined each year over the three decades follow-
ing 1935, and had ceased altogether since 1967 (p. 26). These trends 
were then reinforced by the Furman Court, which "ruled that the 
death penalty was 'cruel and unusual' punishment because it had been 
used in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion" (p. 34; footnote omit-
ted). According to the pattern described by Zimring and Hawkins, 
public opposition to the Furman decision should not have been sur-
prising, since such opposition has occurred in other democracies 
5. Total abolitionist nations include Austria, Finland, Iceland, Portugal, Sweden, and West 
Germany. Countries with death penalties only for specific wartime offenses include Canada, 
Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland. De 
facto abolitionist countries include Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Israel, and the United 
Kingdom. Pp. 5-6. 
6. Pp. 8-10. The authors ascribe the public's favorable view of capital punishment to deep· 
seated appreciation of the ritualistic, symbolic value of the death penalty. Pp. 10-15. 
7. The Territory of Michigan abolished capital punishment in 1846, the states of Rhode Is-
land and Wisconsin in 1852 and 1853, respectively. The first European country to strike down 
the death penalty was Portugal in 1867. Pp. 28-29. 
8. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Furman Court held that "the imposition and carrying out of the 
death penalty in [the cases at bar] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 408 U.S. at 239-40. 
May 1988] Crime and Punishment 1333 
where the death penalty has been struck down (p. 12). Yet four years 
later, in Gregg v. Georgia, 9 the Court acceded to the apparent will of 
the people and upheld death penalty laws that had been purged of the 
defects decisive in Furman. lo 
The authors argue that Gregg was wrongly decided and contend 
that the confusions of Furman 11 were a substantial barrier to achiev-
ing a "historically and doctrinally correct result in Gregg" (p. 51 ). 
The Furman Court declined to address the issue of whether the death 
penalty was per se violative of the eighth amendment (p. 57). But the 
authors point to language in Justice Blackmun's Furman dissent 
which, if properly addressed by the majority, would have led to a dif-
ferent result in Gregg (p. 51). 
In Furman, Justice Blackmun cited a number of cases from 1879 
to 1963, from which he inferred holdings that the death penalty was 
not per se cruel and unusual punishment (p. 52). Then he stated: "The 
Court has recognized . . . that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause 'may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened 
by a humane justice.' . . . My problem . . . is the suddenness of the 
Court's perception of progress in the human attitude since decisions of 
only a short while ago."12 Zimring and Hawkins contend that 
"[d]etailed knowledge of the processes leading to abolition in other 
countries would certainly have provided a better context for the 
Court's deliberations in Furman and might have dispelled Justice 
Blackmun's unease" (p. 63). Viewed with a long-term, evolutionary 
perspective, the change in attitude would not have appeared "sudden." 
While the authors cite the concurring Furman opinions of Justices 
Brennan and Marshall as advancing strong supporting arguments for 
the holding in that case, 13 they believe that the lack of a cohesive re-
sponse to Justice Blackmun's concerns led to the decision in Gregg 
(pp. 63-64). The Gregg petitioners argued, to no avail, that standards 
of decency had evolved to proscribe capital punishment. That Court's 
assessment of contemporary values was flawed by the same short-term 
9. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The Gregg Court held that capital punishment does not "invariably 
violate" the eighth amendment. 428 U.S. at 169. 
10. The holding in Furman was limited to the fact-specific cases considered, with executions 
under those facts being deemed cruel and unusual punishment. Many state legislatures then set 
about passing new death penalty laws that corrected the flaws evident in the laws addressed in 
Furman. P. 41. 
11. The Furman Court filed nine separate opinions, four of which were in dissent. "The 
reasons for that judgment are stated in five separate opinions, expressing as many separate ratio-
nales." 408 U.S. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting). The court stopped short of declaring that all 
capital punishment was unconstitutional. 
12. 408 U.S. at 409-10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349, 378 (1910)) (emphasis added). 
13. The authors contend that by collating and consolidating selected passages from all the 
majority justices' opinions in Furman it is possible to synthesize an opinion that adequately re-
sponds to Justice Blackmun's challenge. P. 58. 
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analysis undertaken in Furman, because the Gregg plurality looked 
primarily to popular opinion and political reaction after Furman (pp. 
65-67). The authors urge, inter alia, that insufficient time had passed 
for capital punishment to lose the symbolic importance reflected in 
public opinion (p. 67). The political reaction, which inspired previ-
ously executing states to pass Furman-proof death penalty statutes, 
was analogous to states' reactions to other decisions in which their 
control over symbolic issues was perceived as having been usurped. 
[T]here are a number of symbolic issues on which state legislatures annu-
ally and deliberately test the patience of the constitutional courts, includ-
ing school prayer, pornography, and abortion .... 
The public outcry against [the Supreme Court decisions] was "deaf-
ening." ... Political leaders throughout the country called for constitu-
tional amendments to overturn the Court's rulings . . . . Initial 
compliance with the rulings was mixed, but eventually many of those 
who decried the decisions have since applauded them . . . . [pp. 44-45] 
The Gregg Court thus seemingly succumbed to the type of pressures it 
had characteristically resisted in cases of the same nature. 
In the second part of the book, Zimring and Hawkins explain state 
governments' hesitance to abolish capital punishment as indicative of a 
political phenomenon particularly acute in the United States. In de-
mocracies abolishing the death penalty, government officials "led from 
the front," going against the grain of public opinion in order to shape 
that opinion into one reflecting a higher standard of humanity (p. 22). 
In the United States, however, elected officials are considered too ac-
countable to the electorate to take such bold action. The public has a 
greater affection for the death penalty as a law than for actual execu-
tions, but the structure of our justice system is such that the govern-
ment cannot act upon this aversion to actual killings. Instead, each 
participant in the system can avoid both personal responsibility for an 
execution14 and a confrontation with public opinion (pp. 95-105). 
The authors also examine the regional disparity in execution poli-
cies, noting the South's responsibility for an unseemly majority of all 
executions in the United States (p. 128). Considering present backlogs 
on death row and potential trends in execution policy, the authors de-
scribe a number of scenarios by which decisionmakers will be con-
fronted with a choice between an assembly line pace of executions and 
some furtherance of the trend toward abolition. 15 Finally, the authors 
survey the various mechanisms by which abolition may be brought 
14. The prosecutor may ask for the death penalty knowing that it is up to the jury to decide 
whether to award it. The jury may award the death penalty knowing that its decision will be 
reviewed by the courts. Judges know that the Governor may grant clemency. The Governor, 
not wanting to appear "soft" on crime, may decline clemency, citing a deference to the decisions 
of the legislature, prosecutor, jury, and courts, all of whom have determined that the particular 
convict should die. Pp. 98-102. 
15. Pp. 130-37. This discussion is found in chapter 5, appropriately entitled "A Game of 
Chicken." 
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about in the long term, and conclude that United States Supreme 
Court action is the most likely candidate. 
[T]here is no doubt that the end will come. Although both the public 
mood and the ideology of governments fluctuate dramatically in rela-
tively short periods of time, in the history of the Western world those 
fluctuations occur within a larger continuous movement of developing 
social and political trends . 
. . . Historical trends will produce the pressure for abolition and the 
national Supreme Court seems the path of lowest resistance to achieving 
that objective. [p. 158] 
The authors find that, the Gregg decision notwithstanding, 
Furman can provide a basis for striking down death penalty laws.16 
Empirical analysis of contemporary executions leads the authors to 
conclude that the death penalty as currently administered is cruel and 
unusual punishment within the meaning of the eighth amendment. 
They follow Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Furman, in which 
he stated that the death sentences in that case were "cruel and unusual 
in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unu-
sual. . . . [T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate 
the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit 
this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed."17 
Pointing to the extremely low percentage of death sentences meted out 
for capital crimes, and to society's inability to define persuasively the 
criteria that should make particular crimes capital offenses, the au-
thors contend that being executed in the United States is, in fact, like 
being struck by lightning (pp. 70-91). Despite their empirical findings, 
the authors realistically do not expect decisive action to be taken in the 
near future (p. 157). 
Zimring and Hawkins present a persuasive argument for a refocus-
ing of the discourse on capital punishment. The asserted negative cor-
relation between respect for human rights and willingness to execute 
certainly seems plausible, and the stark contrast between the human 
rights policies of executing and nonexecuting countries does make the 
United States' execution policy appear anomalous. The authors em-
ploy the human rights thesis to support their assertions regarding the 
contemporary meaning of cruel and unusual punishment. However, 
their logic would have more force if they had examined more thor-
oughly potential alternative explanations for the "clear disjunction be-
tween executing and nonexecuting states" (p. 6). They posit that "[i]t 
is no coincidence that the list of actively executing countries matches 
that of politically repressive countries" (p. 6). This key contention is 
16. The authors find that only one of the nine justices in Gregg, Justice Blackmun, regarded 
Gregg as having overruled Furman. P. 69. See notes 8-9 supra. 
17. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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then followed by a mere two-page summary of the sins of ten nations 
that execute criminals. Considering the fundamental role that the as-
serted relationship plays in the authors' thesis, the topic is worthy of 
further and more detailed examination. 
Capital Punishment and the American Agenda provides a rational 
analysis of the current state of capital punishment in the United 
States, one which does not invite emotional disput~ at each tum. The 
reader need not be a devout abolitionist to concur with many of the 
authors' conclusions regarding the influence of public opinion on exe-
cution policy, the role played by political accountability, and the po-
tential scenarios for the future. The authors' assertions about the 
development of the meaning of the eighth amendment reflect a point-
edly nonoriginalist perspective of constitutional interpretation, yet the 
predictions about the long-term future of capital punishment are more 
pragmatic than argumentive. The book is thought-provoking, and 
may cast a new light on previous arguments concerning the propriety 
of the death penalty. 
- John Pierce Stimson 
